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Regulatory Cooperation and the
Trump Administration
David Zaring *
Regulatory harmonization has allowed financial institutions
to conform to similar standards—absent international or
administrative law—for the past forty years. In light of the
Trump administration’s economic and international approaches
to foreign countries, one might expect regulatory harmonization
to be threatened. This article suggests that regulatory
cooperation has proven to be resilient to administrative change,
and “sticky” in that it makes exiting cooperative regulation
difficult. While the Trump administration’s policies have
affected regulatory harmonization, several factors indicate that
American financial regulators remain committed to the process.
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Introduction
One of the great achievements of international relations in the
past forty years has been the transformation of the regulation of
financial institutions. It is a story that brought us from a world in
which there was no good way for regulators – or investors, for that
matter – to know what financial institutions were doing abroad, to
*

David Zaring is an Associate Professor of Legal Studies at the Wharton
School.
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one in which an international process governs the most important
rules under which any financial institution of any size operates. It is a
story about a new form of global governance—the regulatory
network—that has provided detailed, organized, and binding
governance without adhering to the traditional mechanisms of
international or administrative law. This process of “regulatory
harmonization,” requires domestic regulators to get together with
their foreign counterparts in an effort to conform their requirements
to one another – to agree to do things the same way.
One might think that this story of progress would be threatened
by the new economic and international policies of the Trump
administration. One of the clearest departures from the political
orthodoxy of either party by this administration has been a change in
how it wants the United States to handle its economic relationships
with foreign countries. If the establishment consensus was broadly in
favor of free trade, executed through agreements with foreign
governments, the Trump administration shows real skepticism about
the benefits those deals have brought to American workers, and has
accordingly sought to renegotiate or even exit from them. 1
But the Trump administration has not ended the regulatory
harmonization practices that have so transformed financial
regulation, or regulatory harmonization more generally. 2 Instead,
President Trump’s regulators have continued to embrace international
coordination. 3 The evidence suggests that the enduring appeal of
regulatory harmonization to American policymakers could stabilize
foreign policy between the Trump administration and the
administrations that came before it. 4
This is not to say that regulatory harmonization has been
unaffected by the Trump administration’s economic policies. Many of
the actions in regulatory harmonization during the last two decades
have involved an effort to include it as a mandate in new trade deals. 5
As some of those proposed deals were abandoned and others
1.

Ana Swanson, Trump’s Trade Approach Diverges Sharply from Free Trade
Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/11/15/business/trump-free-trade-republicans.html
[https://perma.cc/D2GW-XMRK].

2.

Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Trump’s New 2018 Deregulatory Agenda, FORBES
(Dec.
18,
2017,
8:30
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites
/waynecrews/2017/12/18/trumps-new-deregulatory-agenda/#3287378f2f60
[https://perma.cc/456V-YMA2].

3.

Gabriel T. Rubin, Trump Team Keeps Approach to Global Financial Rules,
for Now, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2018, 1:44 PM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/trump-team-keeps-approach-to-global-financial-rules-fornow-1516642352 [https://perma.cc/4MY2-VHJ7].

4.

Id.

5.

Id.
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renegotiated, it does appear that this effort to promote uniform
standards through the trade treaty channel has been checked.
Moreover, these regulatory coherence chapters of multilateral trade
deals would not have only affected financial regulatory harmonization.
They would broadly apply to all aspects of the trading relationship.
In this article, I review the enduring commitment of American
financial regulators to international regulatory harmonization. I show
how regulatory cooperation in insurance regulation has checked an
effort by the Trump administration to reduce federal involvement in
insurance oversight. Lastly, I review the emerging efforts to include
regulatory harmonization chapters in trade deals that the Trump
administration has decided to eschew.
I draw two conclusions from this practice so far. First, it suggests
that regulatory cooperation is “sticky,” and not necessarily only to
the taste of internationalists. Perhaps because of path dependence,
perhaps because it works, and perhaps because of a degree of
socialization afforded by four decades of active regulatory cooperation,
the development of common standards for the financial markets has
proven to be a hard habit to break. Moreover, the regular
consultation and promulgation of rules in consultation with foreign
regulators has proven to be a stabilizer of policy across
administrations.

I. The Trump Administration’s Sustained Commitment
to Financial Regulatory Cooperation
Much of what has happened in international financial regulation
began as an effort to solve coordination problems that appeared to be
intractable under international law. After World War II, twenty
three largely western countries 6 entered into the first multilateral
trade deal, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
and created the first two global international financial institutions,
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 7 But
they found it impossible to make progress on the creation of
an International Financial Organization and abandoned the work
after a modest effort. 8
There is still no international financial organization or
global treaty outlining how financial firms should be treated when
6.

See Press Brief, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System,
World Trade Org., available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto
_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).

7.

BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, What are the Bretton Woods Institutions?
(Aug. 23, 2005), https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art320747/.

8.

See id. (stating that only the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund were created at this conference).
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they do business abroad. 9 There is, however, a great deal of
international financial regulation. 10 Today, the networked domestic
regulators—the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, the
Financial Action Task Force, and many more—continue to
promulgate a dizzying array of standards, agreements, best practices,
principles, and rules. 11 Intertwined with these substantive efforts to
coordinate the global regulation of finance has been an effort to
improve the procedures followed by the coordinators.12
This evolution, both procedural and substantive, makes for a
compelling story about a global regulatory enterprise with few peers
not only interesting for the substance, or the process, but also for the
institutions that have been created to manage and develop a global
regime. These institutions declaim legal authority and are comprised
of regulators from the most important financial markets coming
together and agreeing on common approaches to supervising those
markets. 13 There is no treaty, nor are there tribunals; 14 there are
only handshake agreements (backed up by peer review, to be sure) to
handle similar problems universally. 15
Moreover, regulators have expanded the scope of regulatory
targets and the complexity of these institutions has evolved,
particularly since the financial crisis. 16 The old efforts to deal with
the cross-border externalities of finance, which were limited in their
ambitions and range 17, have been cast aside. In their place, a new
9.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The Global Finance Regime (Jan. 23,
2012), https://www.cfr.org/report/global-finance-regime [https://perma
.cc/F69F-828H].

10.

Id.

11.

Alexander Reisenbichler, The Domestic Sources and Power Dynamics of
Regulatory Networks: Evidence from the Financial Stability Forum, 22 REV.
OF INT’L POL. ECON. 996, 997, n. 2, 1017 (2015).

12.

Id. at 997-8; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International
Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 133
(2003) (analogizing these regulatory schemes to instances within domestic
contract law where parties may decide if the agreement is legally binding or
not).

13.

Sungjoon Cho and Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global
Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 515 (2012).

14.

Id. at 498-9; David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial
Regulations, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 685, 691 (2012).

15.

Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 132.

16.

See generally Cho, supra note 13 (discussing the rise and expansion of
regulatory bodies since the 2008 financial crisis).

17.

Daniel Hemel, Regulatory and Cross Border Coordination: Challenging the
Conventional Wisdom, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 222 (2011).
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order has emerged. That order is hierarchical, procedurally regular,
and politically supervised. 18
At the center of the new status quo, at least since the last
financial crisis, is the Financial Stability Board (FSB). 19 The Board is
the middle manager of international financial regulation. It
coordinates the efforts of regulatory networks to establish common
standards for the oversight of financial firms, does some of that work
in its own right, and reports to the political leadership provided by
the Group of Twenty (G20) on the progress of harmonization
initiatives. 20
As Randal Quarles, the Federal Reserve Board’s vice chairman for
financial supervision, has observed, “About one of the important
international bodies created since the crisis to promote global
financial stability [is] the Financial Stability Board.” 21
One might expect an administration unconvinced by
international agreements to be skeptical of the value of the FSB. But
as Quarles, a Trump appointee, has explained, “America’s active
participation in the FSB is important to our nation.” 22 In his view,
and I think it is fair to say that this is the view of most American
financial regulators:
[t]he FSB does not impose obligations, it addresses problemsproblems that are of great importance to the United States and
which, because of the global nature of the financial system, we
cannot address alone. The United States and other governments
created the FSB and participate in it because it is in our
national interests to do so, and that is really the basis of its
effectiveness. The United States is not weaker or less
independent by participating in the FSB or other standardsetting bodies. On the contrary, when rightly structured our
participation in these groups makes our financial system
significantly stronger by ensuring that the U.S. perspective is
part of the discussions and reflected in standards agreed to. 23

18.

Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2002).

19.

Zaring, supra note 14, at 700; Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chairman for
Supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
America’s Vital Interest in Global Efforts to Promote Financial Stability
(June 27, 2018), available at https://www.bis.org/review/r180716d.htm
[https://perma.cc/GKT5-MQRM].

20.

For an analysis, see Zaring, supra note 14, at 700-01.

21.

Quarles, supra note 19.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.
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In fact, Quarles has emerged as a leading candidate
to assume the chairmanship of the board, a role that reflects
the American interest in preserving international regulatory
harmonization even in an era of reduced international cooperation on
other economic matters. 24 But their commitment to
the
preTrump regime of international policymaking over banking
regulation indicates one way in which the ties between
regulators from different countries can stabilize policymaking
between one administration and the next.
Other banking regulators have described the work of international
financial regulation in similar terms. 25 Trump’s choice for the
chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome Powell, has
described international regulatory cooperation as “essential,” and
has, if anything, suggested that American capital rules should be
more consistent with the global regime set forth in the third iteration
of the Basel Capital Accord. 26 Admittedly, this would constitute a
form of modest deregulation, for American capital rules currently
exceed Basel’s minimum requirements, but it is worth emphasizing
that the deregulation would only go so far as international
commitments permit. 27
The pattern is repeated among other American financial
regulators. The Treasury Department has sought more transparency
from international financial regulatory process,but has stated that it
“generally supports efforts to finalize remaining elements of the
international reforms at the Basel Committee.” 28 Treasury Secretary
Steven Mnuchin in 2017 issued a statement of support for the Basel
process. 29
24.

Nick Timiraos, Trump’s Stances Weaken Support for U.S. Official to Lead
Global Banking Body, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2018, 12:14 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-stances-weaken-support-for-u-sofficial-to-lead-global-banking-body-1535308713
[https://perma.cc/7FNT9LUL].

25.

Id.

26.

Michelle Price & Pete Schroeder, Top U.S. Regulators Confident Watchdogs
Can Ease Volcker Rule, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2017, 2:22 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-summit-regulation-volcker/top-u-sregulators-confident-watchdogs-can-ease-volcker-rule-idUSKCN1C81M1
[https://perma.cc/DVU7-BLXH].

27.

David Dayen, Trump’s Regulators Want to Kill a Key Financial Rule That
Even Republicans Support, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/146708/trumps-regulators-want-kill-keyfinancial-rule-even-republicans-support [https://perma.cc/9PB8-8NJA].

28.

DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS, 16 (2017).

29.

Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s
Statement
on
Basel
III
(Dec.
7,
2017),
available
at
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This general support for international financial regulation may
suggest that the process has managed to convince even
financial supervisors inclined to deregulate of its value, or that these
regulators recognize that the globalization of finance has left them
with no choice but to participate in a global effort to oversee it. At
a minimum, it appears that regulators have developed a taste for
international financial regulation that is relatively stable across
administrations.

II. Regulatory Harmonization as an Antidote to
Deregulation: The Covered Agreement and Insurance
A second example of this resilience of regulatory cooperation, at
least in matters financial, concerns the decision by the Trump
administration to sign a so-called covered agreement with the
European Union on insurance supervision finalized during the last
week of the Obama administration. 30 The Trump administration has
otherwise retreated from an emerging federal role in insurance
supervision, most notably by getting out of the business of
supervising the largest insurance companies at the federal level. 31
A. Overview

While the government is getting out of the business of the direct
regulation of large insurers, a role traditionally left to the states,32
regulatory cooperation has kept it in the business of insurance
regulation. 33
The so-called covered agreement with the European Union
illustrates how the growing internationalization of insurance (or
almost anything, really) can impel American regulators, even those of
a deregulatory bent, to engage with their foreign counterparts. The
Trump administration, after some hemming and hawing, announced

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0232
[https://perma.cc/8QCG-X9WZ].
30.

Andrew G. Simpson, Trump Administration to Sign Insurance Regulation
Pact with European Union, INSURANCE JOURNAL (July 17, 2017),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/07/17/
457712
.htm [https://perma.cc/NCS9-9MZ9].

31.

For an analysis, see David Zaring, The Federal Deregulation of Insurance,
97 TEXAS L. REV. J. (forthcoming 2018).

32.

Simpson, supra note 30.

33.

U.S. and EU Covered Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/Pages/EU_Covered_Agreement.a
spx [https://perma.cc/75TH-E6GA].
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on July 14, 2017 that the Treasury Secretary would sign the covered
agreement. 34 He duly did so September 22, 2017. 35
In particular, the covered agreement creates a federal role in
overseeing the capital rules for reinsurers, and limits the kind of rules
the states can impose on insurers. 36 In reinsurance, the agreement
reduces regulatory barriers to foreign competition in the U.S.
and E.U. 37
Its group supervision principles, in contrast, harmonize
the regulatory approaches of the supervision of large insurance
companies’ operation in both jurisdictions. 38 The agreement also
includes an information exchange component designed, among other
things, to deepen regulatory ties between American and
European insurance supervisors. 39
The agreement thus sets
regulatory parameters for the E.U. and U.S. insurance industries, and
requires the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) to monitor and oversee
the implementation of the agreement in the U.S., which must be done
by state regulators. 40
B. The Covered Agreement

It is perhaps useful to further interrogate the way the covered
agreement operates, for it does not embody a uniform commitment to
globalism, and, in its details, is indicative of the careful and stop-andstart nature of regulatory harmonization. 41
As for reinsurance, the covered agreement is best understood as
an effort to reduce regulatory barriers to foreign competition in the
34.

Id.

35.

Id.; see also John S. Pruitt et al., Legal Alert: US-EU Covered Agreement:
(Sept.
24,
2018),
An
Overview,
CAPTIVE
https://www.captive.com/news/2018/09/24/us-eu-covered-agreement-anoverview?utm_source=Captive+Wire&utm_campaign=d343fd3d73EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_04_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&ut
m_term=0_7413756522-d343fd3d73-111835165
[https://perma.cc/423UT6PG] for background on the agreement’s adoption.

36.

Id.; Bilateral Agreement Between The United States Of America And The
European Union On Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance And
Reinsurance, U.S.-E.U., Sept. 21, 2017, T.I.A.S. 18-404 [hereinafter Bilateral
Reinsurance Agreement].

37.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36.

38.

Id.

39.

Simpson, supra note 30.

40.

The Federal Industry, Hearing on H.R. 3762 Before the Subcomm. on
Hous. and Ins., Comm. On Fin. Serv., and U.S. House of Reps., 115th
Cong. 11-12 (2017) (statement of Katharine L. Wade, Chair of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ International Relations
Commission).

41.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36.
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U.S. and E.U. 42 The agreement serves to remove posted collateral and
local presence requirements for E.U. and U.S. reinsurers doing
business across the Atlantic. 43 The reinsurance portion of the
agreement thus reduces trade barriers in both the United States and
the European Union in a way likely to benefit American consumers.44
It is something like a trade deal, contained within the narrower
confines of a limited agreement on international insurance
regulation. 45 In particular, the requirement that foreign reinsurance
firms post 100% collateral to do business in certain American
jurisdictions makes little sense for well-supervised European
reinsurers. 46 This problem has been apparent for years, 47 and yet any
reduction in the collateral requirements, which thereby would open up
the U.S. reinsurance market and introduce new competitors, to the
benefit of insurance companies and ultimately consumers, has been
slow. 48
The agreement prevents U.S. state insurance regulators from
requiring E.U. reinsurers to post such high levels of collateral as a
condition for U.S. firms to be credited for their contracts with E.U.
reinsurers. 49
The United States also got something for American
re-insurance companies. 50 One of the covered agreement’s objectives,

42.

Simpson, supra note 30.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

And it was assessed as such. The American Insurance Association, an
industry group, said that the “agreement on prudential matters will end the
discriminatory actions against U.S. insurers and reinsurers, increase U.S.
competitiveness, and boost the international standing of the U.S. statebased insurance regulatory system.” Marguerite Seidel, AIA Statement on
U.S.-EU Covered Agreement, AM. INS. ASS’N (July 14, 2017),
http://www.aiadc.org/media-center/all-news-releases/2017/july/
aiastatement-on-u-s-eu-covered-agreement [https://perma.cc/PG8N-TCMC].

46.

See generally Ernst Csiszar, Issues Relating to Collateral Requirements
Imposed upon Alien Reinsurers of United States Ceding Insurers, THE
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE - ISSUES AND PRACTICE, 522 (2005)
(discussing the issues regarding collateral requirements for non-US insurers
doing business in the United States).

47.

Id. at 523-4.

48.

Id.

49.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 3.

50.

See The National System of State Regulation and Covered Agreement,
ASS’N
OF
INS.
COMMISS’RS,
NAT’L
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_covered_agreement.htm
[https://perma.cc/W2MF-X5ER] (last updated July 10, 2018) (“In
exchange, the EU will not impose local presence requirements on U.S. firms
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as announced in its Article I, is “the elimination, under specified
conditions, of local presence requirements.” 51
Specifically, the
agreement relieves U.S. reinsurers from the obligation to establish a
local presence—i.e., a branch or subsidiary—in the E.U. 52 The local
presence requirement in the E.U. was also a real burden on the ability
of American reinsurers to access that market. 53 The elimination of
that burden should level the playing field for American and European
reinsurance firms by making it easier for American reinsurers to
access the European market without opening an office in every
jurisdiction in which they do business. 54
The agreement also contains provisions on group supervision.55
Under the E.U.’s “Solvency II” regime, European insurers are
subject to group supervision, and foreign insurers seeking to do
business in the E.U. are required to establish that they are supervised
in a comparable way. 56 Most disquieting for American firms is that
the E.U. reserved for itself the right to impose additional capital and
other regulatory requirements on firms based in countries that were
not determined by the E.U. to have a supervisory system that is
“equivalent” to the Solvency II supervisory system. 57
The covered agreement provides that this requirement will
not be imposed upon American insurers doing business in
Europe, provided that they can establish that they are being
adequately supervised as groups. 58 The “consolidated” form of
supervision assesses the solvency and soundness of insurance firms
operating in the EU, and effectively must defer to U.S. group capital
regulation for U.S. entities of EU-based firms”).
51.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 3.

52.

The National System of State Regulation and Covered Agreement, supra
note 50.

53.

EU/U.S. Covered Agreement: What’s Next?, HOGAN LOVELLS,
https://www.hlinsurancelaw.com/files
/2017/02/EU-US-CoveredAgreement-What-Next.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH9H-F2EF] (last visited
Oct. 8, 2018).

54.

Pruitt et al., supra note 35.

55.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art 4.

56.

U.S.–EU Covered Agreement, FACT SHEET, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY
(Jan.
13,
2017),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/
research/app/uploads/2017/01/Covered-Agreement-Fact-Sheet-011317FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5CC-JTM4]. As Elizabeth Brown has
said, ”Solvency II will likely influence how insurance regulators outside of
the EU regulate insurance, particularly those in the United States.”
Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L LAW 953, 972 (2009).

57.

U.S.–EU Covered Agreement, FACT SHEET, supra note 56.

58.

Pruitt et al., supra note 35.
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with reference to all of their subsidiaries; 59 in the U.S., solvency is
traditionally assessed at the subsidiary, or operating entity, level on a
state by state basis so that each state regulatory monitors the
solvency of each insurance company subsidiary doing business in that
state. 60 The agreement was in this way designed to “establish[]
that the [American] supervisory authority, and not the
[European]
supervisory authority, will exercise worldwide
prudential insurance group supervision,” as the agreement
provides in Article I. 61 It means that U.S. insurance groups operating
in the E.U. will be supervised at the worldwide group level by the
relevant U.S. insurance supervisors rather than through a European
process imposed on American insurers and based on Solvency II.
Finally, the agreement provides for an information exchange that
will amplify and improve contacts between regulators in the U.S. and
E.U. 62 Information exchanges have proven to be the start of more
elaborate cooperation by banking and securities regulators. 63 That
precedent suggests that the agreement on information exchange can
set the stage for further cooperation.
C. Conclusion

If the agreement itself can be celebrated for sensible
policymaking, its most notable characteristic is its emergence in the
context of an administration skeptical of foreign economic
commitments and inclined to deregulate wherever possible. 64 The
covered agreement retains a federal role in insurance supervision by
requiring harmonization with European Union standards in the cases
above, and requires the federal government, which has been reducing
its role in insurance regulation, to oversee it. 65
In this way,
international regulatory cooperation has altered the balance of
59.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 1(c).

60.

See generally Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of
Insurers in the United States, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537 (2015) (describing
the U.S. regulatory structure for assessing solvency among insurance
entities).

61.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 36, at Art. 1(c).

62.

Id. at Art. 1(d).

63.

See David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 475, 485 (2010).

64.

See Max Fisher, What Is Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy?, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www. nytimes.com/2016/11/12/world/what-isdonald-trumps-foreign-policy.html
[https://perma.cc/JXH5-H5FR]
(discussing President Trump’s policy of “America First,” and his willingness
to break away from foreign agreements).

65.

Bilateral Reinsurance Agreement, supra note 35 at Preamble; see also U.S.–
EU Covered Agreement, FACT SHEET, supra note 56.
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regulatory power between the federal government and the states in
favor of the federal government. It is another example of how
regulatory cooperation, in this case adopted through a non-treaty
commitment made to European Union regulators, can stabilize
American
economic policymaking from one administration to the
next.

Iii. The Turn Away From Trade Agreement-Driven
Regulatory Harmonization
Over the past two decades, proposed trade deals have regularly
included a commitment, by the parties to the deal, to some form of
regulatory harmonization. 66
The
regulatory
coherence
and
cooperation components of multilateral
trade
deals
have
evolved from a more traditional set of commitments to
transparent administrative procedure in trade negotiations in an
effort to bring substantive regulatory standards into alignment
across borders. 67
Some of the interest in regulatory harmonization through trade is
long standing, and could even be seen in the GATT’s Article X.68
Article X provided for
the
publication
and
even-handed
administration of trade rules by the contracting parties. 69 These
transparency obligations were reaffirmed in the Uruguay round of
agreements that created the WTO in 1994, which adopted the
GATT. 70
But recently, developed countries have sought to go further.71
Regulatory cooperation offers not just its own appeal to
66.

See generally Jeffrey J. Schott, Opinion, Are Trade Agreements Good for
Americans?: Trade Agreements Benefit Consumers and Producers, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016, 3:20 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2016/03/17/are-trade-agreements-good-for-americans
[https://perma.cc/WH74-NSGP] (discussing the regulatory harmonization
that occurs in a trade deal).

67.

See Phoenix X. F. Cai, Regulatory Coherence and Standardization
Mechanisms in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BRIT. J. OF AM. LEGAL
STUD. 505, 527 (2016) (providing an example of the regulatory coherence
and its novelty).

68.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. X, originally signed Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 182 (revised and resigned on Apr. 14,
1994) [hereinafter GATT].

69.

Id.

70.

Muhammad Ijaz Latif, Uruguay Round of GATT and Establishment of the
WTO, 65 Pᴀᴋ. Hᴏʀɪᴢᴏɴ 53, 63 (2012).

71.

See generally Elizabeth Trujillo, Regulatory Cooperation in International
Trade and Its Transformative Effects on Executive Power, 25 IND. J.
GLOBAL STUDIES 365 (2018) (explaining the regulatory cooperation in
international trade).
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standardization and harmonization of rules across borders. American
regulators and businesses have also thought that it could improve
their procedural protections abroad. 72
The United States, for example, does not pass rules without
engaging in a lengthy notice and comment proceeding prior to
the rule’s passage. 73 What is more—agency missteps in complying
with notice and comment requirements,
including
the
requirement
that
the
agency
respond
to substantive
comments in promulgating the final rule—form a basis for the
reversal of many rules on judicial review. 74
American administrative law is in some ways an outlier in this
regard, but American exporters and multinational corporations find
the prospect of American-style notice and comment in other
jurisdictions to be appealing. 75 Thus far, the European Union has
resisted the effort to institute notice and comment in producing its
own directives or in the regulations promulgated by its members.76
Institutionalizing something like notice and comment rulemaking in a
trade deal has become something that American trade negotiators
have increasingly tried to do.
A. Regulatory Harmonization in the Trans-Pacific Partnership

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 4,
2016 but is awaiting ratification from all parties, 77 and has since been
withdrawn from by the United States. 78 President Trump vowed to

72.

Promote Global Regulatory Cooperation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Aug. 15,
2017, 8:30 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/promote-globalregulatory-cooperation [https://perma.cc/VBN8-4NGU].

73.

See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 §4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2010)
(outlining American process of notice and comment rulemaking).

74.

See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133
(D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d
240 (2d Cir. 1977).

75.

Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. & Pᴏʟ. 695, 710 (2005).

76.

See Interinstitutional Agreement Between the European Parliament, the
Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better
Law-Making, Apr. 13, 2016, 123 O.J.L. 1 and Proposal for an
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation, COM (2015) 216 final
(May 20, 2015).

77.

Cᴏɴɢ. Rᴇsearch. Sᴇʀᴠ., R44489, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP):
KEY PROVISIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 1-2 (2016).

78.

TPP: What is it and Why Does it Matter?, BBC Nᴇᴡs (July 27, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715
[https://perma.cc/MY6ATFX9].
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withdraw from the agreement on his first day in office; 79 he ultimately
met that pledge. 80
The U.S. Trade Representative described TPP as “the first U.S.
Free Trade Agreement to include a chapter on regulatory coherence,
reflecting a growing appreciation of the relevance of this issue to
international trade and investment” but also notes that nothing in
TPP will require changes to U.S. regulations or regulatory
procedures. 81
TPP encourages a number of best regulatory practices, including
publication of its rules, regulatory impact assessments, coordination
between parties, and regular review of its procedures. 82 These
provisions have appeared in prior trade agreements like the
GATT, in that they are procedural, although the inclusion of a
requirement of a regulatory impact analysis – in the U.S., it would be
considered a cost benefit analysis – is new and somewhat
controversial. 83 The agreement would have encouraged notice and
comment rulemaking, although language is significantly permissive
regarding notice and comment timelines (“to the extent possible”) and
do not require responses to comments. 84
Article 25.6 of the TPP would have established a
Committee on Regulatory Coherence which is required to review
regulatory practices at least once every five years with a view toward
making recommendations for amending
the
Regulatory
Coherence chapter to the implementing Commission. 85
Further, per Article 25.11, dispute settlement mechanisms in the
TPP would have applied to the regulatory coherence chapter,
meaning that those provisions are not subject to dispute settlement at
79.

Trump Says US to Quit TPP on First Day in Office, BBC Nᴇᴡs (Nov. 22,
2016),
https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-38059623
[https://perma.cc/NW9M-QLAV].

80.

Trump Executive Order Pulls out of TPP Trade Deal, BBC Nᴇᴡs (Jan. 24,
2017),
https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-us-canada-38721056
[https://perma.cc/6KC2-NHSE].

81.

U.S. Trade Representative, TPP CHAPTER 25 SUMMARY: REGULATORY
COHERENCE 3 (2015), https:// ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/TPP-ChapterSummary-Regulatory-Coherence.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YE9-NRGH].

82.

Id. at 2-3.

83.

See, e.g., GATT, supra note 68.

84.

U.S. Tʀᴀᴅᴇ Rᴇᴘʀᴇsᴇɴᴛᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, Tʜᴇ Tʀᴀɴs-Pᴀᴄɪfɪᴄ Pᴀʀᴛɴᴇʀsʜɪᴘ,
Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ 26: Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴀʀᴇɴᴄʏ ᴀɴᴅ Aɴᴛɪ-Cᴏʀʀᴜᴘᴛɪᴏɴ 2-3 (2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Transparency-andAnti-corruption.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VXS-XBBN].
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Cʜᴀᴘᴛᴇʀ 25: Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛᴏʀʏ Cᴏʜᴇʀᴇɴᴄᴇ 4-5 (2016), https://ustr.gov
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all under the agreement. 86 The Australian scholars Andrew Mitchell
and Elizabeth Sheargold argue
that
exempting
regulatory
coherence obligations from dispute settlement was designed to
encourage greater participation by states in the regulatory
harmonization process. 87
B. Regulatory Harmonization in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was
being negotiated between the E.U. and the U.S. actively during the
Obama Administration, but efforts to conclude a deal have largely
ceased since the inauguration of President Trump. 88
When the agreement was being pursued actively, it was clear from
both parties’ stated objectives that regulatory coherence and
coordination would be addressed in the final agreement to some
degree. 89
The European Union published its proposed text on regulatory
cooperation, and updated it as of March 2016. 90 The text provides
generally that regulatory cooperation will be carried out
transparently
and
made available for public comment, and
specifically requires that a joint E.U.-U.S. Annual Regulatory
Cooperation Program providing an overview of ongoing and planned
regulatory cooperation initiatives be published by each party
online and updated once per year. 91 The program “shall include, as a
minimum, all activities related to future regulatory cooperation
covered by specific or sectoral provisions concerning goods and
86.

Id. at 7.

87.

Elizabeth Sheargold & Andrew D. Mitchell, The TPP and Good Regulatory
Practices: An Opportunity for Regulatory Coherence to Promote Regulatory
Autonomy?, 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 587, 600 (2016).

88.

See Robert Wisner & Neil Campbell, Bringing the Home State Back in: The
Case for Home State Control in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 19 Bᴜs.
L. Iɴᴛ’ʟ 5, 5 (2018) (“Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump,
the United States has… largely abandoned a possible Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union.”).

89.

See Bernd Lange, Reasonable and Balanced Trade Agreement with the
United States: TTIP Chapter on Regulatory Coherence, EUR. PARLIAMENT,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-reasonable-andbalanced-trade-agreement-with-the-united-states/file-ttip-regulatorycoherence/10-2016 [https://perma.cc/2X47-GVRG] (last visited Oct. 19,
2018).

90.

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR TRADE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TTIPEU PROPOSAL FOR CHAPTER: REGULATORY COOPERATION (2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_
154377.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FLR3-5RSG].

91.

Id. at art. x.6.
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services in this Agreement and shall be published at the latest by the
time of signature of this Agreement.” 92
An E.U. fact sheet on regulatory cooperation, published in
January 2015, acknowledges
the
importance
of
regulatory
cooperation
while emphasizing that the Regulatory Cooperation
Body would not have the power to change the rules set out in E.U.
treaties about how regulations are developed. 93 Finally, on March 21
2016, an E.U. position paper titled “Regulatory Cooperation in
TTIP:
The Benefits” detailed the E.U.’s rationale for strong
regulatory cooperation, including freeing resources based on
harmonization. 94
The U.S. Trade Representative did not release a proposed text
on regulatory cooperation, but published a TTP factsheet in March
2014 with general U.S. objectives, including regulatory coherence and
transparency. 95 The factsheet characterizes TTIP as “an opportunity
to develop cross-cutting disciplines on regulatory practices” and gives
examples of such best practices as “greater
transparency,
participation and accountability” in regulatory development,
“evidence-based analysis and decision-making, and a whole- ofgovernment approach” in regulatory management, terms that do
not convey much, but perhaps hint at the policy interest in the
subject. 96 USTR has indicated its hope that the U.S. and E.U. will
examine ways to “increase regulatory compatibility in specific
sectors through a range of regulatory cooperation tools as well
as other steps aimed at reducing or eliminating unnecessary
regulatory differences.” 97 The U.S. aims to promote greater
regulatory compatibility “with extensive input from stakeholders, and
in collaboration with our regulators.” 98
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, one of the most important of
those stakeholders in the U.S., published its own detailed paper on its
92.

Id.

93.
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(Mar. 21, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/
tradoc_154379.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DQN-PAN8].

95.
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Partnership: A Detailed View, OFFICE ᴏF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
(Mar. 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-TTIP-a-DetailedView [https://perma.cc/NZ62-XGT3].
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objectives regarding regulatory coherence and cooperation in the
TTIP on February 27, 2015. 99
In addition to indicating more
general support for publication, transparency, and centralization
of regulatory decisions, the Chamber has indicated its support for
development of a filter to identify measures that have the most
significant effect on the bilateral trade relationship and to prioritize
cooperation on those activities. 100
To that end, the Chamber has
urged the parts to adopt a Regulatory Compatibility Assessment for
those measures that pass through the filter in order to make more
information available to both parties (while not mandating
regulatory decisions), 101 and to create nonbinding Regulatory
Equivalence Assessments to determine which regulations are
equivalent between parties. 102
C. Conclusion

The Trump Administration’s turn away from these megaregionals 103 has shifted
the
effort
to
implement
the
otherwise
generally
informal commitments towards regulatory
harmonization in a trade treaty.
In that sense, the Trump
administration has turned away from the full-throated embrace of
international regulatory standards, which is a turn away from
international regulatory cooperation in general. But the interest in
achieving common standards in the business community remain
strong. 104
We may see that regulatory harmonization continues to be
pursued in practice, if not written into renegotiated trade deals of the
future.
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Conclusion
Regulatory cooperation is not always something to celebrate,
though I and others have marveled at the way it has resulted in a
serious regime of financial regulation, beginning with nothing more
than an increasingly elaborated set of deals among financial
supervisors. There may be good reasons for less burdensome
regulation in finance, or more generally – the Trump administration
has come out in favor of financial deregulation at home. And in
abandoning trade deals with regulatory coherence components, turned
away from a formal commitment to regulatory harmonization,
expressed through a treaty.
But what we see from the international commitments made by
regulators is that they can curb deregulatory impulses, and continue
international cooperation among countries that are feuding on trade
or other grounds. In that sense, regulatory cooperation has—so far—
proven to be a constraint on an administration that otherwise appears
to be less interested in cooperation and strong global standards than
its predecessors.
In this sense, regulatory cooperation is “sticky,” in that it is
difficult to exit from cooperative processes even when those processes
are not particularly deregulatory. This is so for a number of reasons,
including path dependence, socialization, and the straightforward
requirement that domestic regulators respond to the globalization of
the marketplace. 105 Habits of international agreement, it turns out,
are often hard to break.
This stickiness naturally leads to some consistency
between administrations with different foreign policy priorities.
Regulatory cooperation has also operated at a level below diplomacy
and high politics. 106 But as economic matters become more and more
105. See Ian Greener, Path Dependence, Eɴᴄʏᴄʟᴏᴘæᴅɪᴀ Bʀɪᴛᴀɴɴɪᴄᴀ (Sept.
1,
2017),
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Trachtenberg eds., 2008) (defining socialization); see generally Dᴀᴠɪᴅ
Vᴏɢᴇʟ & Rᴏʙᴇʀᴛ A. Kᴀɢᴀɴ, DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW
GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES (2002),
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important in foreign policy, sticky regulatory cooperation used to
address those economic matters should help to smooth the
transitions between administrations with different perspectives—
and in so doing, limit the flexibility of policymakers to do something
entirely different. Perhaps most interestingly, regulatory cooperation
has these effects without in any way binding the hands of the new
policymakers in any legal way.
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